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OPINION
______________  
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Ronald Damon signed a plea agreement with the United 
States accepting responsibility for a federal crime. He served 
time in custody and left prison. Now, having reentered society, 
he wants a fresh start, free from further oversight by the federal 
government. So Damon asked to end his term of supervised 
release a few years early. He offered facts and circumstances 
justifying his request, and highlighted the hardships imposed 
by restrictions on his activities. But Damon’s present desires 
are controlled by a past decision: his contract with the 
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government containing the terms and conditions of his guilty 
plea. Because his plea agreement precludes challenges to his 
sentence, and because any shortening of his supervision would 
amount to a change in his sentence, we will affirm the decision 
of the District Court. 
I. The Proceedings Before the District Court 
A. The Written Plea Agreement  
The facts are not in dispute. Damon pleaded guilty to 
knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with 
intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (as amended in 
2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. As is customary in federal criminal 
practice, the Government and Damon memorialized their 
agreement in writing. The plea agreement includes a provision 
stating that both parties “waive certain rights to file an appeal, 
collateral attack, writ or motion after sentencing, including, but 
not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or a motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (App. at 22.) Schedule A to the plea 
agreement provides:  
Ronald Damon knows that he has and, except as 
noted below in this paragraph, voluntarily 
waives, the right to file any appeal, any collateral 
attack, or any other writ or motion, including but 
not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 
or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which 
challenges the sentence imposed by the 
sentencing court if that sentence falls within or 
below the Guidelines range that results from the 
agreed total Guidelines offense level of 33.
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(Id. at 26.) The agreement also states that, “in addition to 
imposing any other penalty on Ronald Damon, the sentencing 
judge . . . pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841, must require Ronald 
Damon to serve a term of supervised release of at least 5 years, 
which will begin at the expiration of any term of imprisonment 
imposed.” (Id. at 21.)  
Both Damon and the Government executed the plea 
agreement. Following Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(b)(1), the District Judge explained the agreement, including 
the maximum penalties, fines, and period of supervised release. 
And as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(b)(1)(N), the District Court asked Damon whether he 
understood that he was “giving up [his] right to file an appeal 
or otherwise attack the sentence that may be imposed in this 
matter” and Damon agreed. (Id. at 42–43.) A portion of their 
exchange is illustrative: 
The Court:  Do you understand that by the terms 
of the plea agreement both you and the 
government have given up the right to file an 
appeal or post-conviction relief under certain 
circumstances that are set forth in the plea 
agreement itself and in Schedule A to the plea 
agreement? I referred you to those provisions 
before. Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Did you discuss with your attorney 
this waiver of appeal and waiver of your right to 
file for post-conviction relief? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
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The Court: And are you satisfied with the 
explanations that your attorney provided? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: And do you agree with those waivers 
of appeal and waiver of your right to file for post-
conviction relief? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
(App. at 56–57.) The District Court found that the plea was 
“knowingly and voluntarily made” and accepted the plea. (Id. 
at 58–59.) 
B. Damon is Sentenced According to the Plea 
Having pleaded guilty, Damon faced 262–327 months’ 
imprisonment under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. 
Upholding its end of the deal, the Government filed a motion 
for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which the 
Court weighed favorably in sentencing Damon to 144 months’ 
imprisonment. The District Court also imposed the required 
five-year term of supervised release, a $2,000 fine, and a 
special assessment of $100.  
C. Damon Asks for an Early End to Supervised Release 
After serving his prison term and about thirty-two 
months of his sixty-month term of supervised release, Damon 
sought to terminate the remainder of his supervision. The 
District Court found that the waiver provision of the plea 
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agreement barred Damon’s request, and denied his application. 
Damon timely appealed.1  
II. The Plain Language of the Agreement Controls 
On appeal, Damon acknowledges the waiver, but argues 
that it doesn’t extend to his application. The Government 
disagrees and has moved for summary action to enforce the 
terms of the waiver and to dismiss this appeal, or alternatively, 
to affirm the District Court’s order. 
A. Waiving the Right to Appeal 
The parties’ dispute is narrow. Damon agrees that his 
plea was both knowing and voluntary, eliminating 
constitutional concerns. And he does not dispute that his plea 
agreement contains a waiver, so “we must decide whether the 
appellate waiver before us bars this appeal.” United States v. 
Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013). Waivers in plea 
agreements are neither new nor unusual, and we have long 
enforced their terms. See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 
557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). But a waiver only bars an appeal that 
falls inside its scope. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 
(2019). We will enforce an appellate waiver in a plea 
agreement and decline to review the merits of Damon’s appeal 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Damon’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). We exercise plenary review to decide whether a 
defendant’s appeal falls within the scope of a waiver provision 
in a plea agreement. United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 
537, n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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only “if we conclude (1) that the issues [Damon] pursues on 
appeal fall within the scope of his appellate waiver and (2) that 
he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, 
unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.” United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 
2008). Damon aims his arguments at the first step in this test 
and we use familiar principles of interpretation to review.  
B. Damon Identifies no Ambiguity in the Agreement 
We begin by noting what Damon does not argue. 
Damon states that the plea agreement bars a direct appeal of 
his sentence. And he maintains that the “waiver bars an appeal 
of any component of punishment imposed at the original 
sentencing proceeding, including the terms and conditions of 
supervised release.” (Opening Br. at 9.) Instead, he reasons that 
his present motion for early termination of his supervised 
release falls outside the waiver on temporal and factual 
grounds, labeling it as a motion for post-sentencing relief. In 
other words, Damon does not see a textual hook in the plea 
agreement that would allow for a reduced term of supervised 
release as part of his bargain. Rather, he sees an opening in the 
logic behind the text, arguing that the agreement should best 
be construed to allow a fresh examination of his progress based 
on the most recent information.  
Our task is one of interpretation, “guided by the ‘well-
established principle that plea agreements, although arising in 
the criminal context, are analyzed under contract law 
standards.’” Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (quoting Goodson, 544 
F.3d at 535 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “we 
begin our analysis as we would with any contract,” by 
“examin[ing] first the text of the contract.” United States v. 
Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 545 (3d Cir. 2002). “Because we apply 
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rules of contract interpretation to plea agreements, the first step 
is to decide whether the plea agreement is ambiguous or 
unambiguous. A contract is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 551 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In the agreement, Damon waived the right to file “any 
appeal . . . which challenges the sentence imposed by the 
sentencing court if that sentence falls within or below the 
Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level of 33.” (App. at 26.) Damon’s sentence fell within 
this Guidelines range. So the waiver governs if the “sentence 
imposed” on Damon includes the term of his supervised release 
and if this appeal “challenges” that sentence. (Id.)  
1. The Term “Sentence” in Damon’s Plea Agreement 
Refers to All Penalties 
We focus not on intent, but on words, as “the language 
of a waiver, like the language of a contract, matters greatly.” 
Goodson, 544 F.3d at 535. And the word “sentence” is 
commonly understood to encompasses all penalties imposed 
on a defendant, which can include penalties beyond 
imprisonment. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1302, 1597 (5th ed. 2018) (defining 
“sentence” as “[t]he penalty imposed by a law court or other 
authority upon someone found guilty of a crime or other 
offense” and defining “penalty” as “[a] punishment imposed 
for a violation of law.”); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 1180, 1323 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “sentence” as 
“a decision or judgment, as of a court; esp., the determination 
by a court of the punishment of a convicted person” or 
“punishment itself” and defining “punishment” as “a penalty 
imposed on an offender for a crime or wrongdoing”);  BLACK’S 
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LAW DICTIONARY 1428, 1569 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“sentence” as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces 
after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment 
imposed on a criminal wrongdoer” and defining “punishment” 
as “[a] sanction — such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss 
of property, right, or privilege — assessed against a person 
who has violated the law.”). The ordinary meaning of 
“sentence” can only reasonably be read to include all forms of 
punishment or penalties imposed on a defendant. By extension, 
Damon’s “sentence” must be read to include the term of his 
supervised release, bringing Damon’s challenge within the 
scope of the bargained-for waiver.    
The structure of the plea agreement confirms this 
common understanding of “sentence.” Under the heading 
“Sentencing,” the plea agreement provides that the sentencing 
judge will impose penalties that include, at a minimum: (1) 
imprisonment; (2) a fine; (3) forfeiture; and (4) a term of 
supervised release. (App. 20–21.) The plea agreement also 
made clear that “pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841,” the sentencing 
judge “must require Ronald Damon to serve a term of 
supervised release of at least 5 years, which will begin at the 
expiration of any term of imprisonment imposed.” (Id. at 21.) 
Section 841(b)(1)(A), in turn, states that “any sentence under 
this subparagraph shall . . . impose a term of supervised release 
of at least 5 years in addition to such term of imprisonment.” 
Construing the language of the plea agreement in a “manner 
that gives meaning to each provision,” as we must, the term 
“sentence” unambiguously includes the imposition of a term of 
supervised release. United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 516 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
Reading “sentence” to include a term of supervised 
release also agrees with our prior holdings. In Goodson, we 
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held that the defendant’s appellate waiver “encompassed his 
right to appeal the conditions of his supervised release.” 544 
F.3d at 538. Construing the appellate waiver presented, we 
rejected the defendant’s contention “that the waiver’s use of 
the term ‘sentence’ should be construed to mean only the term 
of incarceration” and held that “the duration, as well as the 
conditions of supervised release are components of a 
sentence.” Id. at 537–38. “Under chapter 227 of the Federal 
Crimes Code, the period of incarceration is but one component 
of a sentence. Other components may be probation under § 
3561, supervised release under § 3583, a fine under § 3571, 
and/or restitution under § 3556.” Id. at 537. Indeed, Section 
3583(a) provides that a court “may include as a part of the 
sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term 
of supervised release after imprisonment.” Id. (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(a)) (emphasis in original). Thus, we concluded 
that “the text of the waiver . . . establishes that the term 
‘sentence’ as used in [defendant’s] appellate waiver applies to 
not only the period of incarceration that will be imposed, but 
also any other component of punishment.” Id. at 538; see also 
United States v. Island, 916 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“[T]he supervised release term constitutes part of the original 
sentence”) (internal quotations omitted); Wilson, 707 F.3d at 
414 (“the word ‘sentence’ in a broad appellate waiver . . . 
includes the terms and conditions of supervised release and, 
therefore, bars appeals challenging those terms and 
conditions.”). The “sentence imposed” on Damon likewise 
encompassed the duration of his supervised release.2 
                                              
2 Our reading of the “sentence imposed” on Damon also 
tracks the Supreme Court’s understanding that supervised 
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2. Damon’s Waiver Bars “Challenges” to the Term of his 
Supervised Release 
In the agreement, Damon waived the right to file any 
motion or appeal that “challenges the sentence imposed.” 
(App. at 26.) Damon seeks to evade this language by arguing 
that his motion is not a challenge to his sentence, but a motion 
filed in a separate chronological phase and in a different 
proceeding. But this argument is unsupported by the text of the 
plea agreement and by any sound understanding of what is 
included in a sentence. Supervised release is, as just explained, 
part of the sentence that Damon received.   
The verb “challenges” in the legal context is generally 
understood to mean “to dispute or call into question.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 279 (10th ed. 2014); see also THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 307 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “challenge” as a 
“formal objection” or a legal action “testing the validity of an 
action, particularly by the government.”); WEBSTER’S NEW 
WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 248 (5th ed. 2018) (defining 
“challenge” as “a calling into question; a demanding of proof 
[or] explanation.”). Damon’s motion does just that, 
questioning his original sentence by seeking to shorten the term 
                                              
release is just one component of a sentence. See United States 
v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2019) (plurality opinion) 
(“[a]n accused’s final sentence includes any supervised release 
sentence he may receive[.]”); Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
1826, 1834 (2019) (“Supervised release is a form of 
punishment that Congress prescribes along with a term of 
imprisonment as part of the same sentence.”). 
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of his supervised release. By its very nature, it is a challenge to 
the sentence imposed. 
Although this Court has not addressed the term 
“challenges” in the context of a motion to terminate supervised 
release brought under § 3583(e)(1), the Sixth Circuit decision 
in United States v. Scallon, 683 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2012) is 
instructive. There, the Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he sorts of 
challenges [defendant] brought in his § 3583(e)(2) motion 
could have been raised on direct appeal or as part of a collateral 
attack, and [defendant] unequivocally waived both of those 
options in his written plea agreement.” Scallon, 683 F.3d at 
683–84. The Sixth Circuit therefore held that “a defendant’s 
appeal from the denial of his § 3583(e)(2) motion falls within 
the scope of a broadly-worded appeal waiver like [the 
defendant’s].” Id. at 684. Likewise, the “Sentencing” portion 
of Damon’s plea agreement noted the requirement that he serve 
“a term of supervised release of at least 5 years.” (App. at 21.) 
He cannot now challenge the term of his supervised release by 
reframing it as a post-sentence modification.  
C. Damon is Bound by His Bargain with the Government 
As with any contract, Damon and the Government are 
held to the negotiated terms of their agreement. To interpret the 
waiver as Damon urges would stretch its ordinary meaning 
beyond normal usage. So “we have no difficulty in holding a 
defendant to the plea agreement [when] he seeks the benefits 
of it without the burdens.” United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 
416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted). Thus, “we must construe the phrase ‘any appeal . . . 
which challenges the sentence imposed’ to mean what it 
plainly states” United States v. Banks, 743 F.3d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 
2014), and hold that Damon’s challenge to the duration of his 
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supervised release falls within the scope of his appellate 
waiver. 
 Damon knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea 
agreement with the government that provided him with certain 
undeniable benefits, most notably the Government’s motion 
for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Damon was sentenced to 144 months imprisonment, far lower 
than the 262 to 327 months of imprisonment he faced under the 
Guidelines. In return, the Government bargained for and 
received a guilty plea and waiver of “the right to file any 
appeal, any collateral attack, or any other writ or motion . . . 
which challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing 
court.” (App. at 26.) We find no issue that presents a 
miscarriage of justice. As we have cautioned, a contrary 
conclusion “would permit an end run around the waiver.” 
Wilson, 707 F.3d at 415, n.2 (distinguishing between a 
defendant’s ability to appeal a later-imposed sentence 
modification sought by the government from an appeal brought 
by the defendant to modify the terms of supervised release 
imposed as part of the original sentence).3 So we will affirm 
the decision of the District Court and grant the Government’s 
motion to the extent the District Court’s order is affirmed.  
                                              
3 The Government also raises an important point: it is 
unclear that any reduction of supervised release would be 
appropriate because 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) imposes a 
mandatory minimum term of supervision. But we do not reach 
this issue. See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
